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INTRODUCTION
The Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. Hudson et al.1 case garnered in-
tense public scrutiny,2 in part for its precedent-setting potential, whereby
the poultry industry could assume liability for agricultural pollution associ-
ated with litter and its land application.3 At first glance, the case outcome
simply appeared that industrial agriculture prevailed against attack from
environmental groups. However, when comparatively analyzed in terms
of institutions and societal goals, the Hudson case reveals that the lesson
is far more complex. More importantly, the comparative institutional analy-
sis leads directly to policy prescriptions that can improve water-land
nexus conflict resolution. This Article argues that the judicial process is
poorly positioned to resolve this conflict—relative to other resolution pro-
cesses—and other processes would be more likely for environmental groups
to achieve their goal of improving environmental quality. The judicial pro-
cess often balances the economic efficiency of competing uses (which,
arguably, tip in favor of the agricultural operator targeted by the case), but
it is poorly positioned to process this conflict because of unallocated rights
remaining in the underlying conflict of interests. The judiciary is poorly
positioned to resolve this conflict because, currently, legislatures and agen-
cies (quasi-judicial resolution) offer little guidance on the allocation of
rights and duties involving agricultural discharges. Quasi-judicial pro-
cesses are typically better positioned to resolve highly complex scientific
natural resource conflicts4 and to assign previously unallocated rights,
using legislative rules as guidance, when ecological interdependencies
require systematic processing of scientific evidence. However, there are
so many agricultural discharge conflicts that future dispute resolution
processes will undoubtedly decide more cases in the near future.
1 Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. Alan & Kristin Hudson Farm et al., 278 F.R.D. 136 (D.
Md. 2012) [hereinafter Hudson].
2 Ian Urbina, School Law Clinics Face a Backlash: As They Go After Powerful Interests, Law-
makers Get Involved, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 4, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04
/04/us/04lawschool.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/42QV-SGCG.
3 David A. Fahrenthold, Perdue, Poultry Farm Sued for Polluting Chesapeake Bay, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2010/03/02/AR2010030202408.html, archived at http://perma.cc/2YFR-PBZQ.
4 Joshua M. Duke & Laura A. Csoboth, Increased Scientific Capacity and Endangered Spe-
cies Management: Lessons from the Red Wolf Conflict, DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 539, 539-90 (2003).
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This Article presents a comparative institutional analysis of an
increasingly important type of environmental conflict—the agricultural-
waste-discharge and water-land-nexus conflict—using the recent citizen
suit Waterkeeper v. Hudson5 as a case study. The objective is to assess the
resource allocation efficiency and procedural fairness of the dispute pro-
cessing in Hudson. The Hudson setting involves substantial scientific
complexity, including ecological interdependencies, unobservable and ob-
servable land management decisions, pollutant transport, in-stream re-
moval, and the problem of multiple and diverse sources of water quality
pollution. Although the Hudson farm does fall under a regulated point
source category in a state legislative definition, not all agricultural practices
on the property are regulated. Hudson and other cases6 are demanding
clearer definition of rights allocated and duties assigned in the water-
land nexus conflict.
One part of the argument is that the Hudson7 case is important but
not for the reasons articulated in popular press coverage.8 The case it-
self—as opposed to the broader conflict or agricultural nutrient pollution—
is at best an anomaly holding little precedential insight. At worst the case
led to a judicial opinion that took a severe tone and that led some to see the
case as an unredeemed waste of time and resources.9 The comparative
5 Waterkeeper, 278 F.R.D. at *1.
6 Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (1994); Alt v. EPA,
2013 4520030 (N.D. W. Va.), 76 ERC 2004. In Alt, the court clarified that a CAFO is not an
“industrial” operation and that stormwater in a farm yard is agricultural stormwater
exempt from permit regulation. The key difference in the Alt and CARE cases hinged on
precipitation, in CARE the discharge was observed in absence of precipitation. These
cases show an attempt to expand regulatory authority over agricultural discharges through
stormwater criteria or industrial classification. These cases are important in that they
continue to define Congressional intent. Statute is clear and discharges associated with
CAFOs are not allowed outside of the NPDES permit and discharge associated with
precipitation is exempt.
7 Waterkeeper, 278 F.R.D. at *1.
8 Kirsten L. Nathanson & David Chung, Implications Of CWA Violations In Waterkeeper
v. Hudson, CROWELL & MORING LLP LAW 360 (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.crowell.com
/files/Implications-Of-CWA-Violations-In-Waterkeeper-V-Hudson.pdf; Timothy B. Wheeler,
Eastern Shore Farmers, Perdue Win Pollution Lawsuit, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Dec. 20,
2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/keyword/waterkeeper-alliance, archived at http:
//perma.cc/6WBD-JLWC; Rona Kobell, Judge Scolds Waterkeepers for Actions in Pollution
Suit, BAY JOURNAL (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.bayjournal.com/article/judge_scolds_water
keepers_for_actions_in_pollution_suit, archived at http://perma.cc/B4QL-C9LF.
9 Walter Olson, Ruling Discredits UM Law Clinic’s Involvement, BALTIMORE SUN (Dec. 27,
2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-12-27/news/bs-ed-hudson-lawsuit-20121227
_1_hudsons-waterkeeper-alliance-environmental-law, archived at http://perma.cc/DF6E
-PNZU.
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institutional analysis of the Hudson conflict shows that, although all reso-
lution processes are imperfect,10 the judicial process is not situated to
resolve the conflict well and the legislative process is best positioned to
achieve societal goals of fairness and efficiency. Moreover, two factors
affect a broader analysis of conflicts between agricultural discharges and
environmental interests going into the future. First, some key rights to
the land-water nexus have been allocated, and, as these are fully formal-
ized, there are progressively fewer rights to allocate. Second, over time,
human values of the environment change with increasing scarcity. That
is, as awareness of land use intensity and external effects are more
prevalent, unallocated rights to low intensity uses become more valuable
for environmental interests.11 This implies that recent reliance on quasi-
judicial rules to restrict agricultural discharges, rather than legislative
action, will lead to more conflicts and less clarity. New legislative guid-
ance is needed on what uses of water resources constitute property rights.
In other words, the Clean Water Act has very little to say about nonpoint
sources, and this silence will continue to propel conflicts like Hudson into
courts. Finally, this analysis shows the citizen suit provision in the Clean
Water Act12 did not achieve water protection goals in this case, and the
parties that bring similar suits in the future are not well positioned to
succeed in the judicial resolution process.
There are five sections of this Article. Part I contains the back-
ground of the water-land nexus conflict, set in the Pokomoke Watershed,
on the Eastern Shore of Maryland, which led to the Hudson case. The his-
torical evidence reveals an increasing scarcity of resources, through en-
hanced competition among intensive developed and agricultural land uses
as well as enhanced calls for environmental protection. Part I concludes
that these forces have, inevitability and foreseeably, increased conflict be-
cause of the corresponding decrease in capacity of the water-land nexus
to absorb, store, and cycle nutrients and bacteria from intensive uses.
Part II outlines the comparative institutional analysis method adapted
from Komesar13 and extended by Duke14 to assess conflict resolution per-
formance in specific environmental conflicts. Part III explains the data
10 N. K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY (University of Chicago Press 1994).
11 Terence J. Centner, Nutrient Pollution from Land Applications of Manure: Discerning
a Remedy for Pollution, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 213 (2010).
12 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1994).
13 KOMESAR, supra note 10.
14 Joshua M. Duke, Institutions and Land-Use Conflicts: Harm, Dispute Processing, and
Transactions, 38 J. ECON. ISSUES 227–52 (2004).
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from the Hudson case study, which are used to inform the comparative
institutional analysis. These data include systematic evidence on each
interaction where disputants competed for control over the natural
resource and conditional rights were allocated. Part IV applies the
comparative institutional analysis to the data. Part V draws implications
and conclusions for policy and law.
I. THE WATER-LAND NEXUS BACKGROUND
A. Pocomoke Watershed and Human Impacts
For thousands of years prior to the 1600s, the area in southern
Delaware and southeastern Maryland was covered in dense vegetation
with solid stands of bald cypress and Atlantic white cedar.15 Tribes of the
Algonquin Nation, including the Pocomoke, Nanticoke, and Nassawattox,
occupied the riverbanks and were presumably sustained in part by boun-
tiful fish and bivalve populations such as oysters.16 Beginning in the
early 1600s, the native tribes relocated as European colonists moved into
the area.17
As the European colonists populated the Pocomoke Watershed, the
use of land and water began to intensify. Oysters were an important food
source, but the stock was thought to decline for the first time since human
habitation between 1640 and 1690.18 The early settlers relied on food
from the waterways as well as food grown on land and, from 1700 to 1900,
Pocomoke Watershed land uses included tobacco and other farms, bog iron
mining, and timber felling.19 Timber production was essential to the early
settlers in the late 1700s and early 1800s as swamp cedar was used for
“shipbuilding, shingles, siding on homes, water tanks and coffins.”20
15 Christina Holden, The Great Cypress Swamp, THE MARYLAND NATURAL RESOURCE,
http://www.dnr.state.md.us/naturalresource/spring2005/parkticulars.asp (last visited
Mar. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/MF45-LQPN; William S. Sipple, A Natural
History of the Pocomoke River (1994), http://sippleenvironmental.com/uploads/X3eTY
-7B593559.pdf.
16 Henry M. Miller, The Oyster in Chesapeake History, HISTORIC ST. MARY’S CITY, https:
//www.stmaryscity.org/Archaeology/OysterinChesapeakeHistory.html (last visited Mar. 15,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/F2WQ-T4RK. One translation of Chesapeake in the
Algonquin language is “Great Shellfish Bay.” In the early 1600s early English settlers of
the Chesapeake Bay recorded banks of oysters that were so large ships had to take care
to avoid them.
17 Holden, supra note 15.
18 Miller, supra note 16.
19 Sipple, supra note 15, at 3.
20 Holden, supra note 15.
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Shipping of tobacco and lumber encouraged the growth of towns and
landings.21 By 1850 many of the large trees were gone,22 and by 1930 the
swamp forest had been “completely timbered.”23
Timber clearing affects water quality24 as well as over harvesting
of filter feeders such as oysters. Filter feeders obtain food through filter-
ing water and in the process remove (or sequester) nutrients and sedi-
ment.25 In the years following the Civil War, around five million bushels
of oysters were harvested in Maryland and twenty million bushels were
harvested each year at the peak in the mid-1880s.26 In contrast, by 1920,
annual takes were from three to five million oysters in the entire Chesa-
peake Bay, and populations continued to decline into the twentieth cen-
tury.27 Not only were oysters a food source but they were important to the
ecosystem and water quality of the Chesapeake Bay.28 Recent research
indicates that oysters have substantial filtration capacity and are able
to remove large quantities of nutrients, organic material, and sediment,
and oyster stock decline would have had an early influence on the water
quality in the Chesapeake Bay.29
B. Maryland’s Agricultural History
Maryland’s agriculture history was tied to population migration,
wars, and expanding transportation. At Maryland’s statehood, tobacco
farming had depleted soil fertility in certain areas, but crop and animal
agriculture continued as a regional food supply for the American Revo-
lution.30 Portions of the population migrated to Baltimore, which was a
21 Id.
22 Sipple, supra note 15, at 4.
23 Holden, supra note 15.
24 Scott H. Ensign & Michael A. Mallin, Stream Water Quality Changes Following Timber
Harvest in a Coastal Plain Swamp Forest, 35 WATER RES. 3381, 3381–90 (2001).
25 Colleen B. Higgins, Kurt Stephenson, & Bonnie L. Brown, Nutrient Bioassimilation Capac-
ity of Aquacultured Oysters: Quantification of an Ecosystem Service, 40 J. ENVTL. QUALITY
271, 271–77 (2011).
26 Miller, supra note 16.
27 Id.
28 Holden, supra note 15.
29 RIE Newell, TR Fisher, RR Holyoke, and JC Cornwell, Influence of Eastern Oysters on
Nitrogen and Phosphorus Regeneration in Chesapeake Bay, USA, in 47 NATO SCIENCE
SERIES: IV EARTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES 93, 94 (R.F. Dame, S. Olenin eds., 2003).
30 Agriculture in Worcester County, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND EXTENSION, http://extension
.umd.edu/worcester-county/agriculture-worcester-county (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/E884-CDUV; Agriculture Ruled the South, American History:
FROM REVOLUTION TO RECONSTRUCTION AND BEYOND, http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/outlines
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major port that provided ship building and industrial employment.31 During
the War of 1812 and the Civil War, food supply was again in high demand
and Maryland’s agrarian Eastern Shore supported the soldiers with dairy,
fruit, and vegetables.32 Livestock production increased after the War of
1812 but declined due to disease after the Civil War.33 After the Civil War,
agriculture on the Eastern Shore intensified from three thousand farms
in 1890 to five thousand farms in 1925 as shipping and rail lines began
providing access to markets in Philadelphia and the region.34 The farms
were greater in number but smaller in acreage, signifying an increase in
intensive farming techniques.35 Agriculture was the dominant industry in
Maryland until the Great Depression, when farming decreased, but pro-
duction efficiency gains in farming practices maintained agriculture as a
primary industry on the Eastern Shore into the mid-1900s.36
C. High-Intensity Poultry Farming (Animal Feed Operations
or AFOs)
Agricultural innovations in the mid-1900s, favorable natural re-
source conditions, and new markets eventually led to the transformation
of southern Delaware, eastern Maryland and Virginia (Delmarva) to high-
intensity poultry farming.37 Unlike other livestock farming that began
industrialized production in the early 1900s, chickens were mainly used for
egg production and kept in smaller numbers.38 Some attribute large-scale
poultry farming to a hatchery shipping error in 1923 when an Ocean View,
Delaware, housewife mistakenly received five hundred chicks instead of
fifty chicks.39 However, bird mortality was an issue with early confined
/history-1963/the-colonial-period/agriculture-ruled-the-south.php (last visited Mar. 15,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/DS4S-RD8Z.
31 The Eastern Shore Guide, History of Maryland’s Eastern Shore, EASTERNSHORE.COM,
http://www.easternshore.com/esguide/History.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived
at http://perma.cc/Q5MV-VWY5.
32 See generally Agriculture in Worcester County, supra note 30.
33 Id.
34 Brooks Miles Barnes, History of Agriculture on the Eastern Shore from 1870, EASTERN
SHORE NEWS (Jan. 25, 2006), http://www.esswcd.org/ShoreOutdoorsAgD2.pdf.
35 Id.
36 Id.; UMD supra note 30.
37 Jerry Adler & Andrew Lawler, How the Chicken Conquered the World, SMITHSONIAN
HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY (June 2012), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/ist/?next=/history
/how-the-chicken-conquered-the-world-87583657/, archived at http://perma.cc/SE4K-K2Y5.
38 Id.
39 Terry Plowman, Billion-Dollar Poultry Industry Traces its Roots to 1923 Error,
INTERCOM.NET, http://www.intercom.net/~terrypl/poultry.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2015),
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poultry operations.40 Innovations such as antibiotics and vitamin fortified
feed41 and new bird breeds42 allowed birds to be confined and grown in
large numbers with lower mortality. Birds went from a 16-week growth
period to reach 2.2 pounds in 1920 to 5 pounds in seven weeks by 2009.43
Delmarva offered a favorable set of climatic geologic and demo-
graphic characteristics for poultry farming as well.44 The temperate climate
of the region reduced heating costs of enclosures, and the Coastal Plain’s
sandy soils allowed drainage and reduced diseases carried by water.45
Additional advantages included knowledgeable egg farmers, cheap labor
from the failing timber industry, and proximity to shipping and rail made
getting the poultry to market faster.46 By the mid-1950s, supermarkets
and fast food chains such as Kentucky Fried Chicken demanded getting
chicken to market faster and in higher numbers.47 Increased population,
faster processing, and vertical integration (from egg to bird to table by
one company)48 led to intensified, concentrated animal production such
as the Hudson Farm example.
Animal feed operations concentrate animals to increase efficiency
of supply. The poultry industry uses vertical integration where one com-
pany owns most (if not all) of the steps in the production process from egg
to market.49 Some companies expand to own grain and feed supply or have
stakes in breeding and hatchery portions of the market.50 The purpose of
vertical integration in poultry, as with other industry processes, is to create
uniformity in goals, production, and oversight and ultimately reduce costs
of production.51 Integrators such as Perdue Farms, Inc., contract with fam-
ily-owned business to grow the birds that are received from the integrator
archived at http://perma.cc/L8ZZ-7SXP.
40 Id.
41 Adler & Lawler, supra note 37.
42 Kathy Thayer, Kathy Bonham, Nicole Hollingsworth, & Stacy Tate, The History of the
Delaware Chicken, DELAWARE POULTRY CLUB, http://thedelclub.webstarts.com/ (last vis-
ited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/VZ2L-6NWE.
43 Carrie Hribar, Understanding Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations and Their
Impact on Communities, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH SERVICE, CENTER FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL AND PREVENTION (Feb. 23, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehs/docs/understanding
_cafos_nalboh.pdf.
44 Plowman, supra note 39.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Thayer et al., supra note 42.
48 Plowman, supra note 39.
49 POULTRY MEAT PROCESSING, 2 (Alan R. Sams ed., CRC Press 2001) [hereinafter SAMS].
50 Id.
51 Id.
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owned hatchery, and the integrator owns most, if not all other aspects of
the production process.52
D. Water Quality Impacts of AFOs
Environmental effects from concentrated livestock and poultry have
been reported for decades. Animal production discharges include elevated
concentration of hormones, heavy metals, antimicrobials, detergents, and
disinfectants in the surrounding environment.53 Concentration of chick-
ens also increases manure (and subsequently litter) produced per acre.
This is more usefully seen scientifically as a watershed-nutrient-balance
problem, rather than as an ethical problem of blaming poultry producers
for pollution.54 Poultry concentration involves a massive relocation of nu-
trients in the form of corn, soybeans, and other feed from vast croplands
(which are often located outside the Chesapeake Bay Watershed) to a rela-
tively concentrated livestock production area. Chickens are extremely
efficient (relative to other meat producers such as cattle and hogs) in pro-
ducing meat from feed, but some feed becomes waste.55
Poultry litter is manure mixed with wood shavings or sawdust, col-
lected from the floor of poultry houses, and is typically composted then
spread on crop fields for fertilizer. The litter is composted for several weeks
before it is applied to remove bacteria and reduce nutrient concentration.56
After composting, the litter is spread on agricultural fields where it is a
valuable nutrient input for nearby crop production.57 However, a nutrient
imbalance can arise because the feed nutrients consumed on the Eastern
Shore are derived from extensive croplands that are outside the region.
Ideally, the nutrients (in the litter) would be returned as fertilizer to
grow crops in the Midwest. Removal of nutrients from the Eastern Shore
52 Vertical Integration: What it is- and Why it’s Good for the Chicken Industry. . . and You,
THE NATIONAL CHICKEN COUNCIL, http://www.nationalchickencouncil.org/industry-issues
/vertical-integration/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/RW2Z-BMNU.
53 Hribar, supra note 43.
54 See id.
55 SAMS, supra note 49, at 275.
56 See generally Milan Ihnat & Leta Fernandes, Trace Elemental Characterization of Com-
posted Poultry Manure, 57 BIORESOURCE TECH. 143, 143-56 (1996); S. Mahimairaja et al.,
Losses and Transformation of Nitrogen During Composting of Poultry Manure with Dif-
ferent Amendments: An Incubation Experiment, 57 BIORESOURCE TECH. 265, 265-73 (1996);
George Hochmuth et al., Using Composted Poultry Manure (Litter) in Mulched Vegetable
Production, EDIS (2009), http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/SS/SS50600.pdf.
57 Id.
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watersheds as finished poultry products is insufficient to return, fully, the
nutrient balance of the watershed.58
It is estimated that Delmarva had fifty thousand chickens in 1925,
and that number increased to 602 million by 1998.59 The sheer number
of poultry grown and the use of fortified feed increased the use of feed from
outside of the region, reduced the amount of feed grown within the region,
and also limited the regional use of manure.60 The net result of these
forces is an excess of manure in Delmarva.61 Excess manure is managed in
various ways such as ground application beyond crop-uptake need as a crop
risk management strategy, trucking manure off-site or outside the water-
shed, and pelletization.62 Best management practices (“BMPs”) such as veg-
etative buffers, litter management, and precipitation runoff control, can
be used at the poultry facility or on fields where manure is spread to inter-
cept nutrients and reduce nutrient concentration leaving the field.63 How-
ever, even with the manure management strategies, excess nutrients are
still problematic for waterways in areas where AFOs are present.64
Watersheds with many AFOs (or high agricultural use in general)
may experience water quality impairments such as decreased oxygen for
aquatic species, toxic microorganisms, or bacteria concentrations that
exceed standards due to high nutrient content and bacteria in manure or
litter.65 Eutrophication occurs when nutrients in excess of a water body’s
58 J.T. Sims, R. R. Simard, & B. C. Joern, Phosphorus Loss in Agricultural Drainage: His-
torical Perspective and Current Research, J. ENVTL. QUALITY 27, no. 2 (1998): 277–93; J.
Thomas Sims, Agricultural and Environmental Issues in the Management of Poultry
Wastes: Recent Innovations and Long-term Challenges. In ACS symposium series, vol. 668,
pp. 72–90. Washington, DC: American Chemical Society (1974).
59 Id.
60 See Hribar, supra note 43, at 2.
61 See generally A. Sharpley et al., Impacts of Animal Manure Management on Ground
and Surface Water Quality, in ANIMAL WASTE UTILIZATION: EFFECTIVE USE OF MANURE
AS A SOIL RESOURCE 173 (J.L. Hatfield & B.A. Stewart eds., 1998); L.M. Ward & W. F.
Ritter, Options for Managing Broiler Manure Phosphorus on the Delmarva Peninsula
Bridges, in WORLD WATER & ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES CONGRESS 2003 (Paul Bizier
& Paul DeBerry eds., 2003).
62 See Sharpley et al., supra note 61, at 214–15.
63 See THERESIA LAVERGNE ET AL., LSU AGCENTER, POULTRY ENVIRONMENTAL BEST MAN-
AGEMENT PRACTICES (BMPS) 8-28 (2011), available at https://www.lsuagcenter.com/NR
/rdonlyres/C7ADAF81-1D03-4FC5-9F04-9F890DEE60F5/81515/pub2806poultryBM
PLOWRES1.pdf.
64 Hribar, supra note 43, at 3; Sims, supra note 58, at 289.
65 Hribar, supra note 43, at 2; Robert Howarth et al., Coupled Biogeochemical Cycles: Eutro-
phication and Hypoxia in Temperate Estuaries and Coastal Marine Ecosystems, 9 FRONTIERS
ECOLOGY & ENV'T 18–26 (2011); D.F. Boesch et al., Chesapeake Bay Eutrophication:
2015] WATER QUALITY CONFLICT RESOLUTION 543
assimilative capacity provide fuel for primary production in the water
column (mostly algae).66 When the algae die, dissolved oxygen is con-
sumed from the water column.67 Fish, along with other aquatic organ-
isms, die because they rely on dissolved oxygen to survive.68 Submerged
aquatic vegetation (“SAV”) provides habitat and also produces oxygen.69
As the algae grow, light penetration through the water column is reduced,
which reduces SAV growth and subsequently reduces habitat and oxygen
production.70 The decrease in SAV and dissolved oxygen both increase
fish and other aquatic organism mortality.71 Nutrient excess can also
encourage growth of toxic cyanobacteria and dinoflagellates (Pfiesteria)
and increase drinking water filtration requirements.72 Pfiesteria is a toxic
microorganism related to high phosphorous concentrations that invades
fish and creates a potent neurotoxin that affects humans who have con-
tact with the fish.73 Recently, the toxic cyanobacteria bloom in Lake Erie
near Toledo, Ohio, highlighted the extensive, negative impact of excess nu-
trients.74 In addition, areas with AFOs can have bacteria levels that ex-
ceed primary contact recreation standards necessitating beach closures.75
II. THE COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS METHOD
Institutional analyses are conducted in various ways and differ in
the unit of analysis and what constitutes participation by important
actors.76 Institutional analysis nevertheless provides a framework for
Scientific Understanding, Ecosystem Restoration and Challenges for Agriculture, 30 J.
ENVTL. QUALITY 303 (2001).






72 See generally Joann M. Burkholder & Howard B. Glasgow, History of Toxic Pfiesteria
in North Carolina Estuaries from 1991 to the Present, 51 BIOSCIENCE 827 (2001) (“Many
toxic Pfiesteria outbreaks have plagued the Albemarle-Pamlico Estuarine System,
including events both before and after the 1997 outbreaks in Chesapeake Bay.”).
73 Id. at 839.
74 Carl Zimmer, Cyanobacteria Are Far from Just Toledo’s Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/07/science/cyanobacteria-are-far-from-just-toledos
-problem.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/5NGV-YRCK.
75 Id.; Pamela Wood, Summer Brings Waves of Water Testing for Bacteria in Anne Arundel,
BALTIMORE SUN (June 20, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-06 -20/news/bs-
md-ar-beach-testing-20130620_1_water-testing-bacteria-beaches, archived at http://perma
.cc/3ZGZ-6JCM.
76 See Elinor Ostrom, Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional
Analysis and Development Framework, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 21 (2nd ed.
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researchers to understand the “policy process by outlining a systematic
approach for analyzing institutions that govern action and outcomes
within collective action arrangements.”77 Carr and others compare three
methods for evaluating public and stakeholder participatory action in the
European Water Framework Directive and the Clean Water Act.78 Hardy
and Koontz identify decentralized institutions as local decision making
bodies that also necessitate involvement of the local residents and stake-
holders.79 Hardy and Koontz compare formal (laws and regulations) and
informal (community exchange) institutional rules and the actions that
result from government, citizen-centered, and mixed (government and
citizen) participation to understand decision-making partnerships.80
These two approaches help convey the variety of methods of institutional
analysis, but this Article will follow the widely applied and cited method
from Komesar.81 Komesar’s method uses a participation-centered approach
to examine the performance of different resolution processes relative to
important social goals, such as protection of property or promoting safety.82
Komesar, followed by Duke and Csoboth, focus on the goals of resource
allocation efficiency and procedural fairness.83
Komesar’s comparative institutional analysis (“CIA”) is an analysis
of goal and institutional choices.84 Komesar stresses that analyzing one
institution alone will “tell us virtually nothing about these outcomes.”85
The importance of comparing market, judicial, and political institutions
helps examine what institutional choice best carries out society’s goals
2007); Berit Junker et al., Objectives of Public Participation: Which Actors Should Be
Involved in the Decision Making for River Restorations? 43 WATER RESOURCES RES., no.
10, 2007, at 1; Vincent Luyet et al., A Framework to Implement Stakeholder Participation
in Environmental Projects, 11 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 213–19 (2012).
77 Sehl Mellouli et al., Comparative Analysis of Technology Frameworks, EGOVPOLINET
SYNTHESIS REPORT OF KNOWLEDGE ASSETS, INCLUDING VISIONS (Mar. 3. 2014), available
at http://www.policy-community.eu/results/annexes-to-d4.2/annex-ii.2-to-d4.2-comparative
-analysis-of-technology-frameworks/at_download/file.
78 G. Carr et al., Evaluating Participation in Water Resource Management: A Review, 48
WATER RESOURCES RES., no. 11., 2012, at 1.
79 S.D. Hardy & T.M. Koontz, Rules for Collaboration: Institutional Analysis of Group
Membership and Levels of Action in Watershed Partnerships, 37 POL’Y STUDIES J. 393,
394¬(2009).
80 Id.
81 See generally Daniel H. Cole, The Varieties of Comparative Institutional Analysis, 2013
WIS. L. REV. 383 (2012).
82 KOMESAR, supra note 10, at 5.
83 See Duke & Csoboth, supra note 4, at 541, 551.
84 KOMESAR, supra note 10, at 5.
85 Id. at 4–5.
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of efficiency, justice, and fairness.86 Institutional participation in Komesar
includes “consumers, producers, voters, lobbyists, and litigants.”87 Account-
ing for the participating group’s actions and involvement determine how
well the institutions function; additionally, the adjudicative and political
process can be assessed in similar terms to the market process.88 Komesar’s
framework includes analysis of the costs and benefits of participation in
the market, judicial, and political institutions.89 A recent review showed
that Komesar’s approach has made a significant, extensive impact on
legal analysis.90
Duke adapted Komesar’s approach to form a comparative resolution
process that analyzes institutional performance in specific environmental
conflicts, using the social goals of Coasean91 efficiency and fairness.92
Analysis of performance focuses on seven types of institutions (conflict
resolution processes in reality) that process disputes involving environ-
mental quality.93 Duke’s method extends Komesar’s approach to focus on
micro-level data and dovetails this with an extended version of John R.
Commons’s94 framing of market, managerial, and rationing transactions
with the concept of environmental (or land-use) transactions.95 The seven
general processes for comparison in conflict resolution are: market, quasi-
market, legislative, quasi-judicial, judicial, moral suasion, and alterna-
tive dispute resolution.96 In Duke’s analysis institutions are rules or laws
that guide the functioning of the resolution processes.97 In application,
the Red Wolf Conflict (“Red Wolf ”),98 compares conflict outcomes of the
quasi-judicial and judicial process with the goals of procedural fairness
and an operationalized substantive efficiency concept derived from Coase.99
The Red Wolf analysis concluded that quasi-judicial resolution processes
have a superior capacity to resolve conflicts with increased scientific
86 Id. at 5.
87 Id at 7.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 8.
90 See Gregory Shaffer, Comparative Institutional Analysis and a New Legal Realism,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 607, 607 (2012).
91 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–2, 16, 44 (1960).
92 Duke, supra note 14, at 234, 248.
93 Duke & Csoboth, supra note 4, at 550.
94 John R. Commons, Institutional Economics, 21 AM. ECON. REV. 648, 653–54, 657 (1931).
95 Id.; Duke, supra note 14, at 244–45.
96 Duke & Csoboth, supra note 4, at 550.
97 Duke, supra note 14, at 229–30.
98 Duke & Csoboth, supra note 4, at 542.
99 Coase, supra note 91, at 44.
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complexity.100 Similar to Red Wolf, the analysis of the Waterkeeper v.
Hudson conflict herein examines the resolution processing between land-
owners and environmental private parties. The judicial, quasi-judicial, leg-
islative, and moral suasion resolution processes are compared using the
metrics of procedural fairness and Coasean substantive efficiency.101
III. WATER QUALITY CONFLICT DATA
A. Citizen Suit Provision
The citizen suit provision established statutory standing for envi-
ronmental groups to file suit against anyone “who is alleged to be in viola-
tion of . . . an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter.”102 The
legislative process, through the Clean Water Act, began to allocate rights
to parties in land-water nexus conflicts; however, this Article’s analysis
will show that the rights allocation is incomplete in agriculture discharge
problems and it is the unallocated rights that create conflict between
parties.103 Precedent is unclear in citizen suits, but it is clear Congress
envisioned a limited reach, where citizen suits do not supplant but supple-
ment state and federal enforcement actions.104 The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has renewed focus on meeting goals to improve
water quality, as demonstrated by the 2009 Executive Order105 and the
2010 Chesapeake Bay total maximum daily load (the Bay-wide TMDL).106
Recent litigation suggests pressure is building for EPA to regulate nonpoint
sources as well as strengthen enforcement of agricultural point sources.107
100 Duke & Csoboth, supra note 4, at 542.
101 Coase, supra note 91, at 44.
102 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1994).
103 See supra Parts III.D.1 and III.D.2.
104 Jonathan S. Campbell, Has the Citizen Suit Provision of the Clean Water Act Exceeded
its Supplemental Birth?, 24 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLICY REV. 305, 343–44 (2000)
(arguing that citizen suits that are allowed to proceed after a state consent decree is agreed
upon “muddy the issues” of the regulatory and enforcement process, and that considering
awarding court fees to the plaintiff citizens that spurred the settlement would recognize
the intent of the statute provision).
105 Exec. Order No. 13,508, Chesapeake Bay Protection and Restoration, 74 Fed. Reg.
23,099 (May 15, 2009).
106 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHESAPEAKE BAY TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD FOR NITROGEN
ES-1 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/pdf/pdf_chesbay/FinalBayTMDL
/BayTMDLExecutiveSummaryFINAL122910_final.pdf.
107 The Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. provides that, absent a permit
and subject to certain limitations, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be
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Several recent cases brought agricultural nonpoint pollution into
judicial review. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
in Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm, found
a New York dairy farm’s manure spreading operations, typically considered
a nonpoint source activity, to be a point source.108 The court decided the
operation was in association with a regulated concentrated animal feed
operation (CAFO) and therefore was regulated under the CWA.109 In
Pronsolino v. Nastri the Ninth Circuit Appellate Court upheld the long-
standing CWA interpretation that states must identify waters impaired
solely by nonpoint sources and establish total maximum daily loads
(TMDLs) for those waters.110 In 2011 a landmark decision was made
unanimously in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals against forestry, lum-
ber, and paper products associations.111 The Ninth Circuit held in North-
west Environmental Defense Center v. Brown (NEDC v. Brown) that
polluted runoff from logging roads—again typically considered a nonpoint
source and also exempt from regulation in the CWA—that collects in
ditches is not exempt under the CWA.112 However, in March 2013 the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed this ruling and found that national pollu-
tion discharge elimination system (NPDES) permits were not required.113
Justice Scalia in dissent stated that the majority opinion failed to give
adequate clarity to logging as an industrial activity (industrial activities
are regulated under NPDES).114 This case is important because it is one
unlawful. 33 U.S.C.S. § 1311(a). A pollutant includes solid waste, sewage, biological mate-
rials, and agricultural waste discharged into water. 33 U.S.C.S. § 1362(6). A “discharge”
is “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” 33 U.S.C.S.
§ 1362(12). The term “point source” includes “any discernible, confined and discrete convey-
ance, including but not limited to any concentrated animal feeding operation. This term
does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agri-
culture. 33 U.S.C.S. § 1362(14). Under the Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C.S. § 1342(a)
industrial, municipal, and concentrated animal feed operations (“CAFO”) point sources
are regulated through the issuance of national pollution elimination discharge (“NPDES”)
permits. § 1342. Although Sections 208 and 303 direct states to identify and control non
point source pollution, under Sections 402 and 404 agricultural discharges (stormwater),
not associated with a CAFO, are specifically exempt from regulation. 33 U.S.C.S.
§ 1362(14).
108 Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994).
109 CARE, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994).
110 Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002).
111 Nw. Envtl. Def. Center v. Brown (NEDC v. Brown), 640 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2011).
112 Id.
113 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Center, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
114 133 S. Ct. at 1344 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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(of several) that strongly argues that polluted runoff from diffuse sources
which collects in pipes, ditches, and swales should be considered a point
source. Like the claim in NEDC v. Brown, plaintiffs in the 2011 Maryland
District case Waterkeeper Alliance Inc. v. Hudson et al. alleged Hudson was
discharging illegally without an NPDES permit.115 The District Court of
Maryland dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim, but the implications of the judg-
ment are important to consider in regard to citizen suit efficiency, fair-
ness, and nonpoint source conflict resolution.
B. Hudson Case Study
Hudson is examined as a case study of the transactions that occur
in the conflict resolution process to allocate rights. The timeline of the case
is summarized as follows. The Hudson farm is located on the Eastern
Shore of Maryland approximately 3.5 miles from the Pocomoke River. The
Hudsons’ operation is family owned and contains field crops, poultry, and
beef cattle.116 In October 2009, the Waterkeeper Alliance and the Assa-
teague Coastkeeper the (environmental party) flew over the Hudson farm,
(poultry party) and photographed what was assumed to be a pile of poultry
litter or manure near a ditch. The environmental party sampled water
in the Franklin Branch of the Pocomoke River in October through De-
cember 2009, found elevated levels of nitrogen, phosphorous, and bacte-
ria (pollution), then held a press conference and issued a press release.117
In anticipation that the pile was manure or litter and the poultry area of
the farm was illegally discharging pollution from poultry litter, the environ-
mental party filed notice of intent to sue based on a violation of the Clean
Water Act in December 2009.118 The environmental party continued to
sample the water in the Franklin Branch, found elevated pollution levels,
and issued another press release in February 2010 claiming that the pile
was “uncovered manure” next to a drainage ditch.119
115 Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. Alan & Kristin Hudson Farm (Hudson), Civil Action No.
WMN 10-487 (D. MD. 2012).
116 Id. at *18. Perdue Farms, Inc., a poultry integrator that purchased Cornish hens from
the Hudson farm, was initially named in the lawsuit, and subsequently dismissed under
motion to dismiss. Id. at *1.
117 Id. at *4-5.
118 Id. at *4.
119 Id. at *4-5. The environmental party sampled the Franklin Branch through April 2010
and found elevated levels of nitrogen (Total Kjeldahl Nitrogen), Phosphorous (P), Escherichia
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State of Maryland employees from three agencies, including the
Department of Environment (“MDE”), Soil Conservation District, and De-
partment of Agriculture, visited the Hudson farm for a regulatory inspec-
tion in December 2009.120 This visit was in response to the intent to sue,
and the state employees discovered that the pile, which the environmen-
tal party saw on their flight, was Class A bio-solids from the Ocean City
Wastewater Treatment plant and not poultry litter.121 During the Decem-
ber 2009 inspection, MDE issued a $4,000 fine to Hudson for “improper
storage,” which an administrative judge later declined to impose.122 MDE
visited the Hudson farm again on January 26, 2010, and sampled the
ditches on the farm.123 No fines were issued at this visit; however, one of
the MDE samples revealed significantly elevated pollution levels in the
ditch close to where the environmental party water samples were col-
lected this visit.124
On March 1, 2012, Maryland District Judge William Nickerson
denied cross-motions for summary judgment and the case continued to a
bench trial.125 The trial proceeded with ten days of testimony, and closing
arguments were heard November 30, 2012.126 Judge Nickerson issued his
opinion on December 20, 2012, and in his conclusions of law, he found the
Waterkeepers did have standing based on their use (kayaking) of various
branches of the Pocomoke River.127 The opinion also stated that if the
Hudson farm were the cause of high levels of bacteria and nutrients, then
the plaintiff would be affected.128 However, Nickerson did not find a vio-
lation of the CWA because the plaintiff failed to show by a preponderance
of evidence that the high levels of nutrients and bacteria came only from
the poultry operation.129 During the trial, expert testimony revealed a
Coli (E. Coli, bacteria), and fecal coliforms (FC). Hudson, Civil Action No. WMN 10-487,
at *4–5.
120 Id. at *4.
121 Id. at 11. Class A biosolids are “exceptional quality” and have been treated to remove
pathogens and metals. Farmers may spread biosolids on their fields for fertilizer. Other
biosolid classes or spreading large quantities of biosolids may necessitate a state permit
for use and spreading (Environmental Protection Agency), http://water.epa.gov/polwaste
/wastewater/treatment/biosolids/genqa.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/2C9P-3HUH.
122 Hudson, Civil Action No. WMN 10-487, at *4 n.6.
123 Id. at *5-6.
124 Id. at *1.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at *1, *15.
128 Hudson, Civil Action No. WMN 10-487, at *15.
129 Id. at *19.
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more likely source was manure combined with precipitation runoff from
the area where beef cattle grazed unconfined.130 In dicta, Nickerson found
there was “insufficient evidence to impose CWA liability on Perdue.”131
However, Nickerson also stated in dicta that this does not mean integra-
tors could not, under certain circumstances, be held liable for a CWA vio-
lation.132 Establishing this liability was the foremost goal (in addition to
protecting water quality) of the environmental party because integrator
liability would force a comprehensive change in the production of almost
all U.S. poultry.133
Conflict in this case existed because the poultry party pursued a
high-intensity use of land-water resources, while the environmental party
desired a low-intensity use. Prior to historical intensification of farming
practices, low-intensity use prevailed.134 Prior to the conflict there is no
recognized difference in intensity of use.135 When differences arise re-
garding use of the resource at stake, it is known as conflict activation.136
A resource at stake is described as the resource that provides environ-
mental services to both of the parties.137 In this conflict the resource at
stake is the water-land nexus where the high-intensity use of excess
litter or manure spreading exceeds the capacity of the land and water to
absorb and incorporate the excess. The excess causes external effects to
the surrounding environment, but also lowers the cost of agricultural
production. During the nonactivation period, an informal rights regime
prevails, where the high-intensity user had a privilege to act as if they
had property rights to the land-water resource.138 The conflict arises be-
cause a party contests the privilege and, in informal rights regime, has
no right to restrain the privileged party.139 Following the CWA, a series
130 Id. at *7.
131 Id. at *18.
132 Id.
133 Judge Nickerson Rules in Perdue/Hudson Clean Water Act Pollution Lawsuit, ASSA-
TEAGUE COASTAL TRUST, http://www.actforbays.org/defendcleanwater/home.html, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/MRJ9-XY9L.
134 UMD, supra note 30.
135 See Duke, supra note 14, at 232-33; Duke & Csoboth, supra note 4, at 555.
136 See Duke & Csoboth, supra note 4, at 553.
137 See id.
138 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L. J. 710, 755-56, 769 (1917); DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ECONOMIC INTERESTS
AND INSTITUTIONS 213 (1989); DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY: PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS AND PUBLIC POLICY 15 (1991) [hereinafter BROMLEY].
139 See BROMLEY, supra note 138, at 15.
2015] WATER QUALITY CONFLICT RESOLUTION 551
of legislative, quasi-judicial, and judicial decisions led to the assignment
of conditional rights to the resource at stake.140 Over time, the contested set
(or bundle) of use rights continually narrows, as more formal rules are
articulated and parties are granted rights or duties to observe the as-
signed rights.141 The judicial process in the Hudson case recognized es-
tablished rights to the poultry party and placed the environmental party
in the duty bearer’s position.142 Some rights in this case could be consid-
ered conditional because Judge Nickerson’s opinion implies that, simply
because a violation was not found in this case, it does not mean this is
true in all cases of agricultural operations.143
Recent developments in concentrated animal feed operations
(CAFO) regulation indicate that each party’s set of conditional rights and
duties are continuing to evolve, with the poultry parties, as well as other
agricultural producers, bearing duties to the benefit of the environmental
party through land-use and production restrictions.144 In Maryland, all
large, medium, and some small CAFOs have to apply for NPDES permits
or state compliance (that they are exempt).145 Maryland also has state reg-
ulations for feed operations that do not fit the CAFO categories (termed
a MAFO).146 Since 1998, nutrient management laws require management
plans to protect water quality, and increasing plan-compliance remains
a Maryland Department of Agriculture priority.147 The Hudson farm was
a CAFO by both EPA and MDE standards, but at the time of the suit the
farm did not have an NPDES permit.148 Regulations defined the Hudson
farm as a CAFO, which means it is required to have an NPDES permit
for the regulated areas.149
140 See Duke, supra note 14; Duke & Csoboth, supra note 4, at 553.
141 See Duke & Csoboth, supra note 4, at 553-54.
142 See Hohfeld, supra note 138, at 755–56, 769; BROMLEY, supra note 138, at 15.
143 Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. Hudson, no. WMN-10-487, 2012 WL 6651930, at *16–*17
(D. Md. Dec. 20, 2012).





147 MARYLAND DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, NUTRIENT MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 2013 ANNUAL
REPORT 2(2013), available at http://mda.maryland.gov/resource_conservation/counties
/MDANMPAnnual2013.pdf.
148 Hudson, 2012 WL 6651930, at *16.
149 MARYLAND DEPT. OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 144.
552 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 39:533
C. Characterization of Parties
To follow Komesar’s participatory approach to comparative insti-
tutional analysis and understand how the conflict was processed in Hudson,
it is necessary to characterize the parties and their ability to articulate and
defend their interests in the conflict.150 The drivers of participation costs
include the party’s wealth, numbers, concentration of interest, cohesive-
ness, stakes per capita, resolution, and participation costs; these criteria
define the relative strength of the party’s position in the conflict resolu-
tion process.151 Sophistication is defined herein by the first four catego-
ries (wealth, numbers, concentration of interest, cohesiveness).152 For
example, if a party lacks organization, interests are not concentrated, and
membership is large in number, then it may be difficult to gain sufficient
monetary support that allows the party to present and argue interests
coherently. Thus, they would be lacking in sophistication. The stakes per
capita for each party identify the value of the resource at stake for each
person in that party.153 A resource at stake (as described above) is the
resource that provides environmental services to both of the parties and
in this conflict is the use of the water-land nexus.154 If a party contains
a great number of members, the stakes in the resource are spread among
the individuals. The greater the number of members within a party, the
greater the likelihood of heterogeneous interests and the potential for dis-
parate stakes. If the stakes are low, it signals a weakness in the party and
affects the ability to have the outcome (right) awarded in their favor.155
Participation costs are the costs the parties incur to proceed in the reso-
lution processes.156 For example, the expenses of hiring a lawyer or ex-
perts are costs the party incurs to participate in the judicial process.
The two general types of parties in this conflict are the poultry pro-
ducers and the environmentalists. Others outside of a formal organization
(dormant members) may also have interests aligned with these parties.157
The poultry producers are high-intensity users because they alter the
natural state of the water-land resource. An implication of this behavior
150 See KOMESAR, supra note 10; Duke, supra note 14, at 231; Duke & Csoboth, supra note
4, at 552.
151 See Duke & Csoboth, supra note 4, at 553.
152 See id. at 560 (giving an example of how this definition applies to a given situation).
153 See id. at 533.
154 See id.
155 See id. at 577.
156 See id. at 552.
157 See Duke & Csoboth, supra note 4, at 559–60, 562 n.82.
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is that the high-intensity users have, in effect, limited the use opportuni-
ties valued by the low-intensity users for the same resource. The second
party is the environmentalists such as the Waterkeeper or the Atlantic
Coastkeeper who value the low intensity use of the resource at stake.
The impairment of water is caused by handling methods and land char-
acteristics (ditching, soil loading, and storm water runoff), which allow
fertilizer (manure or litter) to travel from the farm to the waterway. The
conflict’s resource at stake is therefore the nexus of land and water that
is affected by the high-intensity use of land (manure or fertilizer input)
which in turn effects water quality relative to intensity of use. Animal
agriculture production decisions meet water bodies and have the poten-
tial via transportation mechanisms to impact naturally occurring nutri-
ent balances in water bodies and in the Chesapeake Bay. That is not to
say these natural levels must never be exceeded, but rather, that when
they are, a conflict between low-intensity users and high-intensity users
activates.158 The characterization of the two parties and their participa-
tion costs are described below.
1. Poultry Party
The poultry party’s estimated numbers, wealth, concentration of
interest, cohesiveness, stakes per capita, resolution, and participation
costs show the party is well positioned to participate in resolution pro-
cesses. The Perdue Company, Inc. (Perdue) and Hudson farm are part of
the broader U.S. poultry and egg industry, and in Maryland the broiler
chickens are a billion dollar per year business.159 The Delmarva Poultry
Industry is part of the U.S. Poultry and Egg Association, an industry trade
group whose members are producers and processors of poultry and eggs
throughout 27 states and worldwide member companies.160 There are ap-
proximately 1,700 broiler chicken farm families on the Delmarva Penin-
sula who produce 11 million chickens per week.161 These chickens are
158 See id. at 541.
159 Broilers: Production and Value of Production by Year, NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL STA-
TISTICS SERVICE, (ND), http://www.nass.usda.gov/Charts_and_Maps/Poultry/brprvl.asp
(last visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2NEW-8K8F; Facts about Maryland’s
Meat and Chicken Industry, DELMARVA POULTRY INDUSTRY, (ND) http://www.dpichicken
.org/faq_facts/docs/factsmd2013.pdf.
160 About, U.S. POULTRY &EGG ASS’N, http://www.uspoultry.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 15,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/7PCA-5Z32.
161 Industry Tour: How the Broiler Chicken Industry Works, DELMARVA POULTRY INDUS-
TRY, http://www.dpichicken.org/media/nr_view.cfm?id=353 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/47MZ-NNUU.
554 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 39:533
grown for four integrators (including Tyson and Perdue), which control
much of the production process. For instance, the farmers are provided
with materials (bedding), services (bird health care), and technical assis-
tance.162 The poultry industry has extensive economic impacts beyond
production, and it employs more than 14,000 Delmarva residents.163 In
2012, the U.S. Poultry and Egg Association funded $2 million in promo-
tion, education, communication, and research effort.164 The industry group
does not list its annual income from membership, donations, and other
support. This association represents the Delmarva Poultry Industry,165
though other catalytic subgroups of the larger poultry and egg industry
exist.166
Concentration of interest and cohesiveness of the party are related
in that the two parties named in the lawsuit (Hudson and Perdue) are
part of the poultry party. In addition, there is a significant concentration
of interests and cohesiveness in the high-intensity user party because
their interests are aligned in producing poultry. It is the primary busi-
ness, function, and intent of both the named parties and the poultry
party at large.
Stakes (as described above) are the value of the resource at stake
to the party, or the difference between their received value with and with-
out the resource at stake.167 The resource at stake in this conflict is the
use of the specific water-land nexus on and near the Hudson farm. The
various ways poultry litter is managed affects the costs of the poultry
production business, and some techniques that lower the costs of produc-
tion (high-intensity, large litter production) may also create external effects
to the environment.168 The poultry party’s stakes per capita are described
as moderate—meaning important but not the most important aspect of
production—because the costs of managing the poultry litter may be low
or high depending on the individual poultry uses that might be assigned
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 About, supra note 160.
165 Lobbying Spending Database Poulty & Eggs, 2013, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www
.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=A05&year=2013 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/RP79-49R2.
166 Komesar, supra note 10. Catalytic subgroups as described by Komesar represent a con-
centrated group within a greater group that operates on behalf of the greater group. Con-
centrated interests of the catalytic subgroup may spur legal action on behalf of the
greater group.
167 See Duke, supra note 14, at 242.
168 Rufus C. Young, Jr. & Stephen R. Onstot, The Farm News: The National Strategy for Ani-
mal Feeding Operations and Other News, Se11 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 639 (1999).
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rights. Costs of production increase through regulation, which currently
include nutrient management plans, installing best management prac-
tices, and permitting for CAFOs. It will be qualitatively argued below that
the stakes for the poultry party are higher than the stakes for the envi-
ronmental party.
In litigation, Perdue supplied Hudson with expert witnesses and
lawyers that argued the case on the Hudson’s behalf.169 This is because
a loss in the Hudson case could have ramifications for the poultry integra-
tor.170 The cost of litigation for Hudson and Perdue of this particular case
can be estimated because Perdue requested $3 million be covered by the
Waterkeepers Alliance for the costs of the frivolous lawsuit.171 Judge
Nickerson denied awarding court fees as (generally) the lawsuit was not
“frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”172 If lobbying costs are
considered an indication of participation costs in the legislative process,
the poultry and egg industry spent $840,000 in 2013 with a recent egg
and poultry industry high of $1.6 million in 2012.173 A portion of this
total could be attributed to concerted action by the poultry party.
2. Environmental Party
The environmental party’s estimated numbers, wealth, concentra-
tion of interest, cohesiveness, stakes per capita, resolution, and participa-
tion costs show the party is not as well positioned to participate in the
formal resolution process as is the poultry party. According to its website,
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. is an organization focused on helping other
watershed organizations fight for the right to clean water.174 Member
organizations, such as the Assateague Coastal Trust (ACT), receive support
from the Waterkeeper Alliance to battle the common pollution issues
that face many watersheds today.175 The Waterkeeper Alliance states
169 Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. Hudson, no. WMN-10-487, 2012 WL 6651930, at *1, *7
(D. Md. Dec. 20, 2012).
170 See Scott Edwards, Big Poultry Needs to Clean Up After Itself, CHESAPEAKE BAY ACTION
PLAN, http://www.bayactionplan.com/big-poultry-clean-up/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/JW8Q-SSK4.
171 Perdue, Farm Can’t Recoup Pollution Suit Fees, Associated Press, Aug. 28, 2013, http:
//baltimore.cbslocal.com/2013/08/28/perdue-farm-cant-recoup-pollution-suit-fees/ (last visited
Mar. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/64MT-E8ST.
172 Id.
173 Lobbying Spending Database Poulty & Eggs, 2013, supra note 165.
174 Mission of the Waterkeeper Movement, WATERKEEPER ALLIANCE, http://waterkeeper.org
/what-we-do/our-mission/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/K4LE
-3Y5J.
175 Id.
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that the public is the owner of waterways, and “pollution is theft.”176 Fur-
ther, when government fails, “it is the right and responsibility of citizens
to enforce environmental laws and protect our right to clean water.”177
ACT has more than 5000 members and works to protect the Delmarva
Peninsula and the Atlantic Coastal Bays watershed through advocacy,
conservation, and education.178 ACT, a membership organization of the
Waterkeeper Alliance, has a small staff with an executive director, titled
the Assateague Coastkeeper, who is charged with patrolling and moni-
toring the Delmarva Peninsula watersheds.179 The Waterkeeper Alliance
has over 200 organizations in 23 countries on six continents.180 The
Waterkeeper Alliance 2012 audited financial report lists net assets at
$1,611,579, and the ACT Internal Revenue Service Form 990 lists net
assets at $256,331.181
There is relatively less concentration of interest and cohesiveness
of the environmental party when compared to the poultry party. One mis-
sion of the Waterkeeper Alliance and ACT is to protect the waterways
through active citizen involvement.182 However, these interests are not
well aligned; the Waterkeeper Alliance, as the larger group, has a broader
focus (e.g. global climate change and clean and safe energy) than the
ACT because of its international and national focus.183 In addition, this
party would have: (1) active members; (2) members who value clean pollut-
ant free water and may contribute but do not actively participate in the
ACT (or Waterkeeper Alliance) activities; and (3) nonmembers who share
many interests with these groups but do not participate. The latter group
176 You Have the Right to Clean Water, WATERKEEPER ALLIANCE, http://waterkeeper.org
/know-your-rights/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2NUU-9QKW.
177 Id.
178 What We Do, ASSATEAGUE COASTAL TRUST, http://www.assateaguecoastkeeper.org/
(last visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9XZ4-RGNM.
179 Assateague Coastkeeper, ASSATEAGUE COASTAL TRUST, http://www.actforbays.org/coast
keeper/index.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/L3L3-XEEP.
180 Clark Canfield, Waterkeeper Movement Thrives from Maine to Nepal, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, Sept. 29, 2013, available at http://www.pressherald.com/2013/09/29/waterkeeper
-movement-thrives-from-maine-to-nepal/, archived at http://perma.cc/2AE9-PHH2.
181 IRS 990 Form | Fiscal Year 2012, WATERKEEPER ALLIANCE, available at http://water
keeper.org/cms/assets/uploads/2014/07/FY12%20990%20web.pdf; 2012 IRS 990 Filing,
ASSSATEAGUE COASTAL TRUST, available at http://www.actforbays.org/WhoWeAre/Docs
/990form2012.pdf.
182 See Staff Members, WATERKEEPER ALLIANCE (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
183 Advocacy Campaigns, WATERKEEPER ALLIANCE, http://waterkeeper.org/what-we-do
/advocacy-campaigns (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/92XX-EXD2.
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is likely to be very large and likely constitutes a dormant majority.184 With
a small paid staff, ACT is able to provide structure and action for its mem-
bers relative to other watershed organizations who may not have paid
staff. Being a member of the Waterkeeper Alliance focuses ACT’s organi-
zation campaigns and goals and therefore provides cohesiveness to the
party relative to other less organized environmental parties, such as
smaller watershed groups. The diffusion of members’ interests and small
active core characterizes many environmental organizations and influ-
ences the impact the groups have on individual issues outcome.185
3. Per Capita Costs and Benefits of Participation
The overall stakes per capita are the value of some degree of pro-
tected access to the resource at stake to each member within the respective
parties.186 This changes with every institutional change. The participants
compare the potential benefits of change with the costs of participating in
the resolution process.187 That said, one party can often force another
party to participate by unilaterally seeking resolution (such as suing).188
There are differences in the calculation of stakes for the two parties.
Value of the right for the poultry party is observed as private cost of more
expensive management of the litter, which in turn affects nutrient and
bacteria levels entering proximal water bodies. The environmental value
derives from the right to impose these management costs on the poultry
party and an improved use of low-intensity activities, if the water has
less pollution loading. At a simple level, one compares the high-intensity
use of the water-land nexus by Hudson to that of the kayaking of Water-
keepers and the groups they represent along with other low-intensity
activities. In the bilateral world of one farm and a group of affected envi-
ronmentalists, the value of the poultry stake is higher because they face
real costs in changing management practices. However, there would be
184 Wendy Wager, Note, The Participation-Centered Model Meets Administrative Process,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 689, 690-91.
185 See Willett Kempton et al., Local Environmental Groups: A Systematic Enumeration
in Two Geographical Areas, 66 RURAL SOCIOLOGY, no. 4 2001, at 557–78. Kempton et al.
found a surprising number of environmental organizations—more than other researchers.
The groups were diverse and politically focused with core members focusing on essen-
tially the legislative and political process with a lack in ability to motivate the largely
inactive local stakeholders.
186 Duke, supra note 14.
187 Id.
188 Id.
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almost no perceptible change in water quality from this one farm chang-
ing practices. Waterkeeper and ACT represent use values of environmen-
talists that are kayaking on the Pocomoke River. If all farms would be
forced to bare expanded management costs, then water quality would in-
deed improve and the value of the environmentalists’ stake in water use
would expand to include activities such as swimming.189 However, water
quality would not be substantially improved by winning this one case
against one farm. Therefore, the value of the right is lower for the envi-
ronmental party as a whole. However, the conflict had broader implica-
tions than simply the activity of Hudson’s farm, in isolation.
Resource allocation efficiency is evaluated with two states of the
world that might arise from any institutional change, one where an ex-
panded right resides with the environmental party and one where a com-
peting right resides with the poultry farmer party. The Waterkeeper
Alliance’s Clean Water Defense and Pure Farms, Pure Waters campaigns
list goals of strengthening regulatory and legal action and “eliminating
the impacts of factory farms” (respectively).190 These campaigns indicate
there is high value in spending the group’s resources promoting the re-
moval of industrialized farms; nonetheless, diffuse membership dilutes
the per capita stake of the expenditure. If the Hudson conflict was decided
differently and (at the extreme) the environmental party obtained an
injunction against Hudson, pollution entering the Chesapeake Bay would
remain. That is, by winning this particular case, there would be no impact
on pollution overall because conflict represents an incomplete portion of
the impact of approximately 6,000 poultry houses in the Delmarva Penin-
sula (estimate from 1999).191 Further, if some poultry exited the industry,
it would likely be replaced by other land uses that also contribute nutrients
189 A wealth of research conducted over the past several decades has searched for the eco-
nomic value of natural resources and ecological services. Recent literature (e.g., Bonnie
L. Keeler, Stephen Polasky, Kate A. Brauman, Kris A. Johnson, Jacques C. Finlay, Ann
O’Neill, Kent Kovacs, & Brent Dalzell, Linking Water Quality and Well-Being for Improved
Assessment and Valuation of Ecosystem Services, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACAD-
EMY OF SCIENCES 109, no. 45 (2012): 18619–18624; George Van Houtven, John Powers,
& Subhrendu K. Pattanayak, Valuing Water Quality Improvements in the United States
Using Meta-analysis: Is the Glass Half-Full or Half-Empty for National Policy Analysis?,
RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECONOMICS 29, no. 3 (2007): 206–228) describes the multiple
difficulties in not only determining what to value but also magnitude of the value.
190 Campaigns, WATERKEEPER ALLIANCE, INC., http://waterkeeper.org/ (last visited Mar. 15,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/RQT5-5BYT.
191 Peter S. Goodman, An Unsavory Byproduct: Runoff and Pollution, WASHINGTON POST,
Aug. 1, 1999, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/daily/aug99/chicken1.htm (last
visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4FDZ-576D.
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to the waterways. Therefore, the direct stakes of the active and dormant
members of the environmental party are comparatively lower because
not obtaining the right of injunction still allows some use of the resource.
However, if the poultry party lost and the right given to the environmen-
tal party in the form of an injunction, the stakes (in the form of costs of
production or being forced to cease operation) would readily change. That
said, there is a potential for a precedent-setting outcome (if an injunction
was granted) that could trigger gains in related water quality conflicts
by enforcing the cost of water quality protection borne by the poultry
party. This dynamic impact is difficult to estimate, and it helps explain
why the Waterkeeper Alliance likely devoted so much effort to this con-
flict and why Perdue was named as a defendant.
The resolution and participation costs of the environmental party
are estimated to be lower relative to those of the poultry party. The Water-
keeper Alliance was formed in the 1990s from the Hudson Riverkeeper
watershed organization. Both groups concentrate on fighting water
pollution through litigation.192 Unlike the poultry farmer party, the envi-
ronmental group does not appear to have a specific industry or interest
group that concentrates on lobbying alone.193 The Assateague Coast-
keeper and other paid staff of the Waterkeeper Alliance lobby as part of
their job duties, and advocacy appears to be one of the top duties for the
Assateague Coastkeeper.194 The operational model for the Waterkeeper
Alliance is to engage local law clinics, as occurred with the Hudson case.
The University of Maryland’s law clinic has been criticized for represent-
ing the Waterkeepers, not only because the case was ultimately assessed
to be weak by the judge but also because the clinic is taxpayer-funded
and yet was attacking an important state industry.195 From the judicial
opinion, one infers that the experts and argument-quality of the Water-
keeper were of lower quality than that of Hudson and Perdue.196 In sum,
192 Who We Are, Board of Directors, http://waterkeeper.org/who-we-are/board-of-directors
/robert-f-kennedy-jr/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/L9MQ-U7Y3.
193 OPEN SECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived
at http://perma.cc/4NMM-73BM.
194 ASSATEAGUE COASTKEEPER, Assateague Coastal Trust, http://www.actforbays.org/coast
keeper/index.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6NZD-FQAE.
195 Walter Olson, Ruling Discredits UM Law Clinic’s Involvement, State-Funded Programs
Should Not Go on Ideologically Driven Environmental Adventures like the Hudson Farm
Case, THE BALTIMORE SUN, December 27, 2012, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-12
-27/news/bs-ed-hudson-lawsuit-20121227_1_hudsons-waterkeeper-alliance-environmental
-law (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/564P-RNVC.
196 Hudson, supra note 1. It can be inferred from Judge Nickerson’s comments during
presentation of the facts and opinion that the Waterkeeper Alliance argument, evidence,
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the costs of the environmental group’s participation in the conflict resolu-
tion process were lower compared with the poultry farmer’s costs in part
because the multibillion dollar poultry industry is able to provide better
support through the judicial process than grassroots-volunteer organiza-
tions. This does not mean that “industry” should win over the “environ-
ment,” just that the monetary status and cohesiveness of the poultry party
provide better opportunities for positive outcome in the judicial process.
The poultry party is highly organized, concentrated, and sophisti-
cated, with at least 14,000 members in Delmarva.197 The cohesion derives
from the vertically integrated nature of poultry production in the region,
where a corporate integrator closely monitors the production process and
inputs managed by the “grower” farmer. The stakes per capita are medium
due to varying costs of production. The costs of participation in formal reso-
lution are high but are spread over many well-organized groups, meaning
that the average participation costs are low. Most formal participation
would take place, due to the concentration of interests, with representa-
tives such as lawyers, lobbyists, and experts.
The stakes per capita for the environmental party are comparatively
low, as argued above. Member numbers for the party are not readily
available, but this party likely contains a large dormant population.
However, the effect of this particular case on the outcome of pollution
reduction to the Chesapeake Bay is effectively zero because it ostensibly
affects a single operation. If the judgment affected precedent, then the
remaining 6,000 poultry houses might be considered and the stakes per
capita would be higher, but the costs would also be higher in organizing
the disparate environmental interests. The costs of participation in the
narrow, one-farm conflict are low because there is a catalytic subgroup,
but the sophistication is relatively high because of this catalytic sub-
group.198 Stakes per capita and factors described above are an important
for consideration in the next section that analyzes institutional efficiency
and fairness.
The summary of the party characteristics reveals that protracted,
complex conflict resolution exposes the strength of the poultry party and
the comparative limitations of the environmental party. The poultry party
and presentation of facts was substandard compared to Hudson’s.
197 Look what the Chicken Industry Is Doing for Delmarva, https://www.dpichicken.org
/faq_facts/docs/Delmarva%20Chicken%20Production%20Facts%201969-2011.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 15, 2015).
198 Komesar, supra note 10. As described in Komesar, the “catalytic subgroup” is a smaller
group within a dormant majority that operates to activate the dormant members through
collective action.
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also has a higher valued use for the resource at stake—this is due largely
to the direct stakes per capita, which are low for the environmental party.
This, in turn, will affect the efficiency and fairness of the resolution pro-
cesses further described below.
D. Transaction Outcome and Rights Allocation
Environmental transactions are instances where two parties
challenge one another for presumptive or legal control over the resource
at stake.199 In this conflict, environmental transactions occur in market,
legislative, and judicial resolution processes throughout the history of the
dispute, over the course of which specific rights of the two parties are as-
signed and made more specific. During this period of dispute processing,
control over the resource at stake has the potential to be reallocated. The
transaction events move through general and specific resolution pro-
cesses that determine the outcome and resultant resource rights allo-
cation. General resolution processes are: market, quasi-market, judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative, moral suasion, and alternative dispute resolution
(such as mediation or arbitration).200 Specific resolution processes are the
constructed arenas where the transaction outcomes are determined, such
as a given state court of first instance.201 The specific resolution processes
may occur at federal, state, and local levels and in legislative, quasi-
judicial, and judicial bodies. The quasi-judicial bodies enact regulations
following federal or state statute (laws) and have ability to impose fines
and approve or decline project permits.
Environmental conflict originates in an informal (or presumptive)
rights regime, where the high-intensity user of the resource acts with
privilege and shifts costs via negative externalities at will to others (low
intensity users).202 The informal rights regime ends, and a formal rights
regime begins, first with local ordinances, a state statute, and/or a federal
statute, and then followed by administrative rules (i.e., nutrient manage-
ment regulations, water quality standards, and pollution discharge per-
mits) that restrict the rights of the high-intensity user (i.e., animal feed
operations).203 The parties’ interests conflict over the rights allocation,
where each party wants the fullest set or bundle of rights to access the
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resource at stake. The bundle of rights term is used to explain that property
rights include multiple pieces, not just one right.204 The environmental
party received rights under the CWA that are expressly granted (no
unauthorized discharges to Waters of the United States are allowed).
However, unallocated rights remain (nonpoint source) and the environ-
mental groups seek to obtain rights through pursuing point source
operations in litigation.
1. Informal Rights Regime
Environmental transactions allocate rights, progressively moving
the rights regime from informality to ever more formality.205 In an in-
formal (or presumptive) rights regime, formal institutions are not present
to restrict explicitly or liberate rights.206 Nonactivation is a period of time
when the resource at stake is not scarce, meaning the low-intensity use
is maintained by default.207 In the Hudson conflict, the transactions begin
with an informal rights regime and a prolonged period of nonactivation,
but this arrangement was altered during the agricultural industrialization
period with attendant water pollution. From the post-colonial era to the
industrial era, growth and lack of municipal and regional infrastructure
allowed sewage and other pollutants to be discharged directly to streams.
Population growth and market regime encouraged increasing resource
use through the 1800s (timbering and bog iron mining),208 which presum-
ably created small quantities of pollution.
In early America, the privilege holders were landowners that used
their land in ways that negatively affected water quality. Based on recent
studies that show water quality degradation with deforestation and mining
inference, complete timbering of swamp cedar and bog iron mining pre-
sumably negatively affected water quality.209 The conflict arises because
204 Daniel B. Klein & John Robinson, Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the Property
Symposium, ECON JOURNAL WATCH 8(3): 193–204, Sept. 2011; Armen A. Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, THE J. OF ECON. HISTORY 33, no. 01, 16–27 (1973);
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, LAW AND ECON., 341–53 1 (1967).
For example, a landowner may have a stream on his property, but the right to use the
stream as he wishes may be restricted by local, state, and federal law. The government also
has the right (through statute) to collect tax on the property.
205 Duke & Csoboth, supra note 4.
206 Commons, supra note 94; Bromley, supra note 138.
207 Duke & Csoboth, supra note 4.
208 Sipple, supra note 15; Holden, supra note 15.
209 See generally IAN R. CALDER & D. R. MAIDMENT, HYDROLOGIC EFFECTS OF LAND-USE
CHANGE, MCGRAW-HILL INC., 1992.
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interests are in contrast between parties regarding resource use. Water
quality degradation constitutes externalities, which occur when one party
has the privilege to pollute and no right exists for the other party to stop
the pollution. The costs of pollution are borne by society, specifically those
who value the low-intensity use. In early America, institutions were not
formally in place to process the conflict of increasing water pollution due
to various natural resource (land) uses. Also, at this time, the relative
value of agricultural and other extractive production likely exceeded the
value of a clean environment for the early Americans. As such, during
these informal rights regimes, there was likely little political pressure for
legislation that altered the status quo to protect the environment and
restrain landholders. Presumptive rights would thus persist until pressure
grew by the increasing relative social value of water quality as part of the
increasing scarcity of clean environments.
2. Formal Rights Regime
Through the first half of the 1900s, only modest institutional change
occurred via statutes and regulations, which allocated particular rights
and offered limited restrictions on landowners through zoning. It was in
the early 1900s, that institutions truly constrained land use behavior that
impacted water pollution. Throughout early America in the 1920s, zoning
laws and ordinances were used to determine appropriate land uses, which
allocated rights among private property owners.210 In the Pocomoke
Watershed and Worcester County, agriculture was a leading land use,
and current zoning reflects high-relative-value agricultural land uses.211
Zoning ordinances in Worcester County were used to allocate rights to the
high and low intensity users through the state and local legislative pro-
cesses; certain industries were restricted to particular areas (i.e., zones)
for early planning purposes.
The federal Water Pollution Control Act (WPCA, 1948) and amend-
ments (CWA 1972, CWA 1987) allocated rights through the federal
legislative process—the U.S. Congress.212 The WPCA and amendments
210 Stuart Kaplow, P.A., A Brief History of Zoning in Maryland, (Aug. 2003), http://www
.stuartkaplow.com/library3.cfm?article_id=94 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/FPZ6-YYXS. “There were early land use laws in this country and as early
as 1692 Massachusetts towns relegated the location of slaughterhouses to upwind non-
residential areas. Later precursors to modern zoning were fire districts, areas in certain
cities where wooden buildings were prohibited.” Zoning as a comprehensive institutional
restriction on land use came much later in New York 1916.
211 Maryland Department of Planning Land Use Map, http://planning.maryland.gov (last
visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/68RD-HD7Z.
212 The Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.
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established a process that could be used to restrict the rights of landholders
and provided conditional rights to environmental interests. The CWA
began the formalization of rights, thereby removing the presumptive right
from high-intensity users and began to require sharing of costs through
technology improvements and decreasing emissions. The CWA also re-
quired the states to set standards and control pollution in waterways, and
contained the provision for low intensity proponents (environmentalists)
to identify pollution externalities and object to high-intensity use via quasi-
judicial or judicial processes. The WPCA, amendments, and state statutes
provided a process to liberate or restrict landowner’s rights through the
permitting process as described below.
It is well-known that the CWA exempted agricultural nonpoint
source discharges directly, however, the EPA’s concentrated animal feed
operation rules (CAFO Rules 2003–2008) required states to require Na-
tional Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits for
CAFOs, and required land application of manure to be addressed.213
Poultry (and other animals) that are confined and of a certain size (by ani-
mal unit or poultry house size) can be considered a CAFO based animal
numbers and the configuration of the farmland.214 In effect, the agricul-
tural nonpoint source became a point source in need of an NPDES permit
by definition when the operation is of a certain size and “. . . is designed,
constructed, operated, or maintained, such that a discharge to surface
waters of the State WILL occur” through ditches or pipes.215 The CAFO
rules and other Maryland statutes such as the Water Quality Improve-
ment Act further constrained and allocated formal rights to the low-inten-
sity party.216 The state promulgated nutrient regulations that restricted
farm landowners (high-intensity users) through requirements for litter
handling, farm configuration (ditching piping, spreading) and farm dis-
charge during weather events (storms). Again, the environmental party
won some rights through the high-intensity users (poultry and other ani-
mal farms) altering their desired production process and bearing costs.
213 Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFO)—Final Rule, U.S. EPA, http://water
.epa.gov/polwaste/npdes/afo/CAFO-Regulations.cfm#court (last visited Mar. 15, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/6KSK-Y2UH.
214 Maryland Department of the Environment, AFO (CAFO/MAFO) Webpage, http://www
.mde.state.md.us (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/B4TE-UY4W.
215 Id.
216 Maryland Department of the Environment Water Quality Improvement Act—Nutrient
Management, http://www.mdot.maryland.gov/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/24LD-HAQB.
2015] WATER QUALITY CONFLICT RESOLUTION 565
Rights were defined for point sources with the enactment of the
CWA; conversely, the CWA largely left nonpoint (field) agricultural sources
of discharge unregulated. Indeed, following the CWA, the environmental
party did not have well-defined rights specifically because CAFO thresh-
olds exclude many operations and because nonpoint sources and agricul-
tural storm water are excluded from regulation.217 The latter two sources
constitute a recognized majority of agriculture pollution entering the
Chesapeake Bay.218 In pursuit of the unallocated rights, the environmen-
tal party in the Hudson case exercised its express right designated in the
citizen suit provision of the CWA.219 To understand how the CWA and
ensuing federal and state regulation do not create a fully formalized
(Hohfeldian) rights regime (only conditional rights to the environmental
parties), environmental transactions of Hudson are detailed below.220 The
citizen suit provision enabled this conflict to reach judicial resolution.
IV. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Moving from informal to formal rights regimes involves allocation
of rights to the parties based on resolution processes through the creation
of institutions. The process by which these rights were assigned is impor-
tant in the comparative institutional analysis below, which will be com-
pleted in two steps. Each instance where allocation of rights is possible
constitutes a transaction. The transaction outcomes assign rights and are
used as in Duke (modifying the method of Komesar) to assess two goals:
(1) the Coasean substantive efficiency of the rights allocation; and (2) the
procedural fairness of the dispute processing.221
A. Procedural Fairness
The assessment of procedural fairness is conducted by evaluating
the representation of parties’ interests in the conflict resolution process.
The parties’ characteristics described above are used to assess each party’s
ability to advocate its positions in the resolution process and point to
strengths and weaknesses that affect individual transaction, and ultimately
217 Clean Water Act, supra note 107.
218 National Research Council, Achieving Nutrient and Sediment Reduction Goals in the
Chesapeake Bay: An Evaluation of Program Strategies and Implementation, Washington,
DC: The National Academies Press, 2011.
219 Clean Water Act, supra note 12.
220 Hohfeld, supra note 138; BROMLEY, supra note 138.
221 KOMESAR, supra note 10; Duke & Csoboth, supra note 4.
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resolution process outcomes. In the water-land conflict and Hudson case,
transaction outcomes and rights allocation in the legislative, moral
suasion, quasi-judicial, and judicial resolution processes are examined
and assessed for procedural fairness.
1. Legislative
Procedural fairness assessment of the legislative actions include
the relevant federal and state statutes: CWA and Water Quality Improve-
ment Act (Maryland nutrient management law). The legislative process
creates the institutional structure by which disputants can articulate
their interests and compete for formal rights. It also establishes some
formal rights and duties such as the requirement that point sources follow
NPDES procedures or farmers comply with basic nutrient management
planning and implementation.
Prior to the initial water quality statutes, no formal process existed
for the environmental party to articulate its interests with respect to en-
vironmental quality. Legislative resolution thereby provides a way for
the environmentalists’ voices to be heard without directly creating the out-
come. In addition, the legislative process is a low-cost way, albeit indirect,
for environmentalists with low per capita stakes to participate. Similarly,
the poultry industry, like all low and medium per capita stakes parties
that are source of water quality loadings, now have an ability to defend
their practices from legislative constraints. So, the process of creating
these statutes offered considerable procedural fairness. The interpreta-
tion of the CWA is that the nonpoint sources are largely exempt from con-
trol, while the point sources are subjected to a regulatory process. This
outcome matches the interests of the two parties here, suggesting that
both were able to articulate their interests without securing full rights
over one another’s uses of the resource at stake. Subsequent statutes,
however, tended to increase the regulatory processes available, which
tended to support the environmentalists’ articulation of their interests. This
suggests robust participation by environmentalists. In contrast, the fact
that there still is little direct, rigorous statutory control over many nonpoint
sources suggests that the poultry farmer party (and agricultural parties in
general) also continued to participate fully in the legislative process in
the years following the CWA.
2. Moral Suasion
Moral suasion is a resolution process usually used by an environ-
mental group to place pressure on entities that it claims are harming the
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environment. It is an informal process in that no formal institutions are
created; instead, environmental parties persuade emitters to abate, volun-
tarily, some level of discharge. In this conflict, the environmental party
issued press releases to raise negative profile of poultry party. Informa-
tion used in the press releases—specifically, that the pile observed during
the fly-over was poultry manure and a “mixture of human waste and
poultry manure”—that was deemed incorrect in litigation222 indicates the
fundamental imbalance of participation in the moral suasion resolution
process. Furthermore, Hudson and Perdue had little ability to correct or
challenge the contentions made against their activity. In sum, moral sua-
sion had procedures that did not generate fairness in this conflict. That
said, moral suasion is not used because it is procedurally fair. It is not a
public forum or other means where both parties participate and are
heard. The Waterkeepers group likely saw moral suasion a way to raise
awareness and achieve some conflict resolution without having to use
formal conflict resolution procedures.
3. Quasi-Judicial
Quasi-judicial resolution processes involve major rules and more
specific interactions between the poultry party and the environmental
party through the Maryland Department of Environment (“MDE”) visits
in December 2010 and January 2011. The poultry party is affected di-
rectly by federal and state CAFO/AFO/MAFO rules and regulations. The
rule-making quasi-judicial resolution process is governed by institutional
protections of procedural fairness within the Administrative Procedures
Act (“APA”).223 The APA requires the rulemaking process include stake-
holder and citizen input before rules are promulgated or to offer affected
parties recourse through judicial review if rules are deemed in excess of
the agencies’ authority.224 This key provision attempts to ensure that the
voices of different interests are heard during the rule-making process.
However, recent analysis suggests there may be serious impediments to
222 Hudson, supra note 1, at 13. “After the discovery that the pile on the Hudson Farm was
bio-solids, and not chicken manure as first alleged, Phillips and Waterkeepers continued
to represent to the press and public that the pile contained a mixture of human waste
and chicken manure . . . Phillips continued to state in press releases that the pile contained
chicken manure, despite the fact that she had no evidence to support that representation.”
223 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
224 Id.
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full participation of affected stakeholders.225 Maryland state regulation
has similar public notice and participation requirements in the permit
process for CAFO/MAFOs.226
Indirectly, a host of agency decisions shape the agricultural industry
and, in turn, affect the incentives for poultry farmers to select the size and
management option on their farms. Formal rights regimes affect the loca-
tion of processing and marketing facilities, management of the size and
configuration of operation, and waste quantity and management. There is
also a growing number of incentive-based programs to encourage agricul-
tural operations to retire lands and adopt management practices that de-
crease nutrient loadings to water bodies. These institutions complicate
the analysis of quasi-judicial resolution processing because they do not di-
rectly affect the resource at stake and some of these policies are voluntary.
In contrast to the legislative process’s more general guidelines on
how to assign rights, enforcement activity by MDE directly affected the
resource at stake and led directly to the litigation. MDE visits to the de-
fendant’s farm were in response to the Waterkeeper’s allegation of unper-
mitted release from improper poultry manure storage on the Hudson
property. During MDE’s first visit in December 2009, an inspection re-
vealed that the pile was not manure but bio-solids from the Ocean City
Wastewater Treatment Plant.227 The inspection found the poultry areas did
not show evidence of discharge.228 A second visit by MDE on January 26,
2010 included water sampling to determine if the bio-solids pile contrib-
uted residual pollution to the water.229 Hudson was assessed a fine on the
first visit for “improper storage,” but an administrative judge declined to
impose the fine.230 No fine or other violation was found on the second
visit.231 No discharge was observed from the poultry houses; however, the
facts of the case suggest that cattle manure was in direct contact with
the ditches on the farm.232 Procedurally, the quasi-judicial process exhib-
ited some fairness to the environmental party because the allegation of
225 Wendy Wagner, 30 Years of Comparative Institutional Analysis: A Celebration of Neil
Komesar: The Participation-Centered Model Meets Administrative Process, 2013 WIS. L.
REV., 671–92, (2013).
226 MDE, supra note 216. Public notice, and potentially public hearings, are part of the
Maryland permit process for CAFOs and MAFOs.
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a regulation violation made by the Waterkeepers was investigated. How-
ever, from the perspective of Hudson, it may appear procedurally unfair
to be targeted with an enforcement action based solely on the complaint
of an external party and singled out for enforcement from the broader
poultry farming population. Beyond the selectivity of the enforcement, no
evidence could be located that the MDE overstepped regulatory authority
when investigating and determining apparent or real violation of state
or federal law. Waterkeepers allegation of discharge from the “pile” or
discharge of “poultry manure” was thoroughly investigated. It is clear
from findings of fact that high pollution levels were in water samples
taken from the proximal stream by the MDE and the ACT; however, the
MDE was responding to the allegation of the point source discharge from
a pile or the houses, not the source related to the cattle in the fields.233
4. Judicial
There was only one judicial transaction in the Hudson conflict.
The judicial process was similar to the quasi-judicial process in that the
case focused on the violation reported by the Waterkeepers of discharge
from poultry manure in waters of the United States. The citizen suit provi-
sion allowed the environmental party to access the judicial process di-
rectly without relying on quasi-judicial action. This ability to participate
contrasts with the coerced participation by Hudson. Despite the ease
with which they accessed the process, the environmental party seemed
to have difficulty articulating its interests with a compelling argument.
The reading of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law written by Judge
Nickerson reveals that the Waterkeepers were pursuing the wrong
source of pollution and were unable to provide a cohesive case.234 The
industry support for the poultry party may have provided more expert sup-
port for the defense in as much as maintaining focus on the claim made.235
B. Substantive Efficiency
The transactions in the formal rights regime allocate rights rela-
tive to the resource at stake, which can be analyzed in terms of the goal
233 Hudson, supra note 1, at 16–19.
234 Id.
235 The Hudsons’ Lawsuit Update, Myth vs. Fact Save Farm Families (October 2012) http:
//www.savefarmfamilies.org/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc
/D7EX-V4FN. This website offers the fact that the Hudsons were responsible for their
own representation and Perdue did not provide legal support.
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of substantive efficiency. Substantive efficiency will be determined using
a Coasean analysis,236 whereby efficiency is enhanced when rights are
allocated to the party that has the highest social value for the resource
at stake.237 As argued above, the poultry party appears to have a higher
value for the resource at stake because the resource at stake involved a
minimal impact on overall water quality, as it was related only to the
Hudson farm. Therefore, processes that tend to allocate rights to the
poultry party will tend to produce substantive efficiency.
1. Legislative
The legislative resolution processes tended toward substantive
efficiency. Though the statutes establish a process that might restrict
industries and firms from unabated pollution, the statutes are not likely
to end all activity in any industry. Moreover, statutes tend to put little
restrictions on agriculture as a practice (unlike industrial or municipal
point sources) and completely exempt nonpoint sources. In sum, the legis-
lative resolution established processes that might potentially be used to
benefit the environmental party, but, on balance, they did not entirely
restrict the poultry party and thus tended toward efficiency.
2. Moral Suasion
The moral suasion resolution process in the Hudson case consisted
of using provocative press releases. The press releases in the Hudson case
were, obviously, to benefit the Waterkeeper interests. Although no rights
were allocated in the process, it tended to work against the goal of sub-
stantive efficiency because it attempted to assign rights to the lowest-
valued user. That said, moral suasion was incomplete. Many of the dormant
stakeholders that the Waterkeeper Alliance may have been attempting
to sway into action were not activated.
3. Quasi-Judicial
The quasi-judicial process assessed against the goal of substantive
efficiency reveals whether the right resides with the highest valued user.
In the case of MDE visits, some rights were conditionally assigned to the
Waterkeepers when a fine was assessed to Hudson. However, a fine was
236 Coase, supra note 91.
237 Duke & Csoboth, supra note 4.
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not imposed in a second inspection. Constraining the large industrial poul-
try operations defined as CAFOs within the CWA statutory limits tended
to allocate rights to the lower-valued user. In sum, the quasi-judicial re-
strictions on the Hudson were slight, and the conditional rights allocated
tended to benefit the poultry party. Therefore, the quasi-judicial process
tended to generate substantive efficiency with respect to the resource at
stake in the Hudson conflict.
4. Judicial
The judicial process assigned rights to Hudson, which resulted in
achieving the goal of substantive efficiency. The court questioned the
merit of the environmentalist argument, thereby raising the evidentiary
bar for future cases. In effect, this protects farming operations from threat
of poorly construed accusations and thereby allocates the right to unen-
cumbered operations.
C. Comparative Institutional Analysis Summary
The parties’ interests are incompatible because intensive agricul-
ture wants to use the same water for discharges that environmentalists
want free from excess nutrients. The environmentalists view this high-
intensity land use, when manure is spread beyond the capacity of the
land to absorb the nutrients, as an impingement on their right to clean
water. Waterkeepers want the right to prevent environmental costs by
using formal institutions to assign duties to high-intensity agriculture,
such as concentrated animal feeding operations, preventing any high-
intensity agricultural use that negatively affects water quality. Using the
judicial process resulted in the outcome, finding that the Hudsons are
conducting permissible operations under the current law.
Comparative institutional analysis of this conflict included com-
parison of the performance of each resolution process to social goals. The
goal of fairness was best achieved in legislative resolution where both
parties were represented by catalytic subgroups with access to the pro-
cess. The quasi-judicial and judicial processes incompletely delivered pro-
cedural fairness, and moral suasion was unfair to the poultry party. The
legislative, quasi-judicial, and judicial processes tended to be substan-
tively efficient with rights allocated to the highest valued user. The moral
suasion process did not result in rights assignment, but, if successful, would
have been inefficient. Among the informal processes, prior to conflict acti-
vation, the market tended to be efficient but unfair, as the environmental
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party did not have the ability to participate. Therefore, this analysis con-
cludes that the legislative process was best positioned to achieve the goals
of procedural fairness and substantive efficiency in resolving this particular
conflict of discharges from a concentrated animal operation. This analysis
should hold lessons for similar agricultural-environmental conflicts at
the nexus of land and water.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
This comparative institutional analysis was performed to under-
stand the relative performance of dispute processing following the CWA
and ensuing resolution processes that allocate rights to parties involved
in environmental conflict over high-intensity land use and water quality
degradation. The comparative institutional analysis reveals the resolu-
tion process (market, legislative, moral suasion, quasi-judicial, or judicial)
that performed the best in terms of the social goals of substantive efficiency
and/or procedural fairness. Methods of analysis followed Komesar’s
participation-centered approach and Duke’s transaction analysis at each
stage of the conflict.238 Transaction outcomes and description of the poul-
try party and the environmental party positions revealed whether the goals
of Coasean substantive efficiency and procedural fairness were achieved
in each resolution process. If rights were assigned to the highest valued
user, in this conflict the poultry party, the result was Coasean efficiency.
If each party’s position allowed for sophisticated, organized participation
in the resolution process, then procedural fairness resulted.
The purpose of the analysis was to examine the resolution process
of the environmental conflict issue of “Who bears the external cost of the
high-intensity use of the resource at stake?”239 In the Hudson case, the
environmental conflict was over intense land use that triggered a chal-
lenge by the Waterkeepers. The intent of examining this water-land conflict
and case study was to determine if any one resolution process performed
better than others when compared with the goals of efficiency and fair-
ness. The legislative resolution process performed the best in terms of
fairness and efficiency, but this result may be surprising and difficult to
apply in future water-land nexus conflicts. Simply, legislative resolution
performed the best but it never addresses, conclusively, nonpoint or other
obvious sources such as restrictions on cattle in the field. The judicial
and quasi-judicial processes revealed, clearly, that nutrients and bacteria
were present in water near the farm, but the outcome validated Hudson’s
238 KOMESAR, supra note 10; Duke, supra note 14.
239 Duke & Csoboth, supra note 4.
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interests in remaining unrestrained. The judicial result was driven by
the relative weaknesses of the environmental party argument and, in
effect, recognized the higher social value of the poultry party.
The quasi-judicial processes implemented and enforced rules of
the legislative process. The legislative process established the rules of
future processes that remedy conflict between the incompatible interests
of the two parties. In a previous comparative institutional analysis of
environmental conflict, the judicial and quasi-judicial process were fair
and efficient and yet the quasi-judicial process was better suited to handle
scientific complexity inherent in a complex environmental conflict.240
However, the Hudson conflict can be considered “incompletely processed”
due to the unpersuasively argued environmental interests, with the argu-
ments framing and pursuing the wrong problem (poultry nutrient and
bacteria source as pollutants rather than the actual sources). The case was
important in the larger conflict of Chesapeake Bay, but is a poor example
of individual conflict resolution. The resolution process resulted in sub-
stantive efficiency and procedural fairness but the result of the resolu-
tion process did not adequately address the conflict over the resource at
stake. Simply assessing either the highest valued use through substan-
tive efficiency or procedural fairness in one case does not address the
deeper, larger conflict of recognizing the unallocated rights that are sought
by the environmental party. The Hudson case is an example of the envi-
ronmental party inadequately arguing for their interests in accordance
with the institutions established by the legislative, quasi-judicial, and
judicial resolution process.
The Hudson decision leaves the possibility that runoff from agri-
cultural fields could be considered a violation of the CWA. Evidence that
juries find agricultural sources (even “diffuse” sources) in violation of the
CWA can be found in CARE v. Southview.241 These cases indicate that
the common law movement may be to place agricultural nonpoint source
discharges under point source definitions where appropriate, or lead to
a clear definition of more sources that clearly generate pollution and can
be considered for CWA violation. The path forward for nonpoint sources
may be an extension of existing statutory language to include more prac-
tices, rather than regulate nonpoint sources under new amendments to
law.242 Other paths suggested in the past are more regulatory flexibility
240 Id.
241 CARE, 34 F.3d 114.
242 Terence J. Centner, Nutrient Pollution from Land Applications of Manure: Discerning
a Remedy for Pollution, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 213 (2010).
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in instituting the CWA goals and crafting legislation to insulate out-
comes from political bias.243
To move toward resolving the conflict of intensive land use and
water quality externality of CAFOs, the quasi-judicial institution should
be the best suited to settle disputes through scientifically based application
of law. The quasi-judicial institution is moving toward tighter regulation
in agriculture and, in the future, Hudson will operate under a NPDES
permit. However, the regulators, as with many permit restrictions on dis-
charges, will be limited by the ability to monitor completely the CAFOs
and enforce the permit conditions. Sorisio argued that a solution to lax
enforcement in the nutrient management regulation by the Department
of Agriculture demonstrates the power of enforcement should be with the
Department of Environment.244 Some impediments to judicial and quasi-
judicial processes were highlighted in this case study and are found in tort
cases as well.245 The costs of information for the environmental groups is
an important consideration as they prepare their litigation or complaint.
Wagner summarizes that even the “ ‘worst’ regulatory litigation” have
value in that they can lower the cost of information for potential future
cases by revealing information that may have previously been unobtainable
by opposing parties.246 Unfortunately— as pointed out—the Waterkeeper
maintained status with erroneous information in pursuit to the only
source that was regulated on the Hudson farm, the poultry operation.
In the event another catalytic sub-group pursues litigation, they
will (hopefully) be guided by Judge Nickerson’s opinion and should frame
their legal and scientific pursuit of rights better. The conflict may be
better resolved in the local legislative institution where zoning or other
regulation changes mitigate intensive agriculture’s influence on water
bodies by requiring buffers. In certain situations, the conflict may be
resolved in a market structure where incentives to reduce intensive land
use provide farm benefit as well as water quality benefit. These incen-
tives are currently being explored and developed within quasi-judicial
institutions and could be structured to provide conflict resolution through
market transactions.
243 David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory Control: The
Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515 (1996).
244 Paul L. Sorisio, Poultry, Waste, and Pollution: The Lack of Enforcement of Maryland’s
Water Quality Improvement Act, 62 MD. L. REV. 1054 (2003).
245 Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort
Litigation, 95 GEO. L. J. 693 (2007).
246 Id. at 307.
